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Mass surveillance: my part in the reform of
GCHQ and UK intelligence gathering
The GCHQ building in in Cheltenham. 'Take the recent case of Amnesty
International’s emails being found on GCHQ computers. Does it matter whether
or not they were actually read by a person?' Photograph: Barry Batchelor/PA
t was an unusual group. An investigative journalist, a moral philosopher, an
internet entrepreneur, a cyber-law academic, a government historian, a computer
scientist, a technology exec, a long-time cop, an ex-minister and three former
heads of intelligence agencies. I wondered not just how but if we could agree on
anything, let alone an entire set of recommendations to reform UK
communications surveillance.
Yet we did. The Royal United Services Institute panel was set up by Nick Clegg[1],
the then deputy prime minister, in response to revelations from the US
whistleblower Edward Snowden[2] about the scale of intrusion by US and British
intelligence agencies into private lives. Our remit: to look at the legality,
effectiveness and privacy implications of government surveillance; how it might
be reformed; and how intelligence gathering could maintain its capabilities in the
digital age.
Edward Snowden's revelations made it
clear: security oversight must be fit for the
internet age
Nick Clegg
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It wasn’t easy and there were several times when I thought I would be writing a
minority report with one or two of the panel members. But in the end we reached
consensus: the report – published today – proposes that the security services
continue with bulk collection of communications data, but with improved
oversight and safeguards.
It wasn’t the ideal any of us individually might have chosen, but neither does it
contain items any of us heartily oppose. For me there were four main victories and
one loss. At what point is privacy engaged? For the security services and
government it only becomes an issue at the point when a human looks at
material. This is how vast quantities of data could be intercepted, stored and
analysed by computer without much considering of privacy implications. For me
privacy is engaged from the moment information is accessed and stored. Take the
recent case of Amnesty International’s emails being found on GCHQ computers[3].
Does it matter whether or not they were actually read by a person? The mere fact
they were intercepted and stored by an intelligence agency is worrying enough.
In bulk collection the potential exists for anyone to be watched at any time. One
of the red herrings put our way was that GCHQ does not conduct mass
surveillance because it does not read everyone’s email. What was not mentioned
is that GCHQ[4] might intercept and store large quantities of it, as the Amnesty
case demonstrates.
For me privacy is engaged from the moment information is accessed and stored
The point of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon[5] wasn’t that everyone was actually
watched at all times, it was that they could all potentially be watched. It is the
possibility of omnipotent surveillance that acts as a chilling effect on any
behaviour that potentially offends the state or the powers that be. For those who
commit acts of journalism or legal advocacy that directly challenge state power,
the risks in such a society are great.
This is why the report states that privacy is engaged at point of collection and
recommends regular review of data retention policies by oversight bodies to
ensure they remain proportionate.
Another partial win is changing the way surveillance is authorised. I went on to
the panel with a clear goal to shift the system away from authorisation of
surveillance by politicians to a more independent judicial system. Most
democratic countries abolished political warrants for the reason that political
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expediency should not override the constraints of the law. And judicial warrants
are more likely to gain cooperation from US internet companies. After all, the US
stopped letting politicians sign off intrusive warrants in 1789 with the fourth
amendment[6].
The spies and politicians initially wanted no change to the current regime.
However the recommendation by David Anderson QC on judicial warrants[7] made
it much harder to stick with the status quo. Even so, the majority of panellists
opted for a compromise: a largely judicial authorisation system but with the
secretary of state signing warrants for national security and economic wellbeing,
but subject to judicial review.
The stories you need to read, in one handy
email
Read more
The third point may seem innocuous: a recommendation that the commissioners
be given a statutory right to refer cases to the investigatory powers tribunal[8].
The IPT is the only “court” where people can seek legal redress against improper
surveillance. Yet obtaining evidence to bring a case to court is almost impossible.
Groups such as Privacy International, Liberty and Amnesty are reliant on either a
whistleblower like Snowden or pure speculative guesswork. The commissioners
are the only outsiders allowed to see the inner workings of intelligence gatherers,
yet they face prohibitions on disclosure so cannot bring the fullness of their
findings into the public domain, nor refer them to the IPT.
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Finally, there is a subtle shift away from the “clean bill of health” given to past
and current surveillance practices. This was very contested. A good deal of
assumptions were made that, in my view, gave the benefit of the doubt to those
whom we were supposed to be investigating. The intelligence and security
committee report[9] gives conclusive assurances that nothing the intelligence
agencies have done is illegal or wrong.
Not surprisingly, I encountered most resistance when pushing for information
about what the agencies are actually doing
I, and one or two others, did not feel we had seen enough evidence or knew
enough about the activities to give such an assurance. How can we endorse what
has not been avowed? The activities we did know about may not be technically
illegal (though it is a question still before the courts), but they were done without
public knowledge or a public mandate. To use such vast and intrusive powers
without a public mandate is more worthy of sanction than endorsement in my
opinion. At the very least, past activities show a clear failure to respect the
democratic process.
Not surprisingly, I encountered most resistance when pushing for detailed
information about what the agencies are actually doing. Are they using personal
data from other parts of the government such as the NHS to build algorithms to
predict future criminals? I don’t know. But if we are to be an informed citizenry –
a prerequisite in a democracy – we need the agencies to avow their most intrusive
un-targeted surveillance practices. Otherwise, they do not have a public mandate
for them. In effect, they are acting outside the democratic system.
It was also impossible to make judgments about the effectiveness of bulk
surveillance techniques because the underlying data is available only to those
with a stake in promoting its effectiveness, rather like granting a pharmaceutical
company with a drug to sell total secrecy over its clinical trials. The best we could
do was this: “It is unrealistic for the intelligence agencies and some specialist
parts of the police service to operate in very transparent ways. They could not be
effective if they did. They should, however, be rigorously and independently held
accountable, and the oversight mechanisms must themselves be highly
transparent to the public.”
Heather Brooke, a professor of journalism, was a member of the RUSI independent
surveillance review panel
This article was amended on 14 July 2015. An earlier version said David
Anderson’s report gave conclusive assurances that nothing the intelligence
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agencies had done was illegal or wrong. That is not the case.
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